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Is Natural Law Timeless? 
JONATHAN CROWE* 
Natural law theories hold that human action is oriented towards 
certain intrinsic goods and governed by practical principles 
accessible to us by virtue of our nature. These goods and 
principles make up the content of natural law. This essay argues 
that both the content of natural law and our understanding of its 
requirements evolve throughout human history. This represents 
a diachronic, rather than synchronic, understanding of natural 
law. This perspective is contrasted with the ‘new natural law 
theory’ of Germain Grisez and John Finnis, which depicts 
natural law as timeless and unchanging. Finnis seems to think 
that natural law does not change because it exists in the mind of 
God; however, a belief in God as the source of natural law is 
equally consistent with a diachronic perspective. I defend this 
view through reference to the writings of Thomas Aquinas and 
the structure of the biblical narrative. 
 
Natural law theories hold that human life is directed towards certain 
intrinsic goods suited to our nature. Our engagement with these goods 
is governed by our human capacity for reflection and, as such, by what 
the ‘new natural law theorists’, such as Germain Grisez and John Finnis, 
call ‘principles of practical reasonableness’. 1  It is these goods and 
principles that make up the ‘natural law’ that gives such theories their 
title. A central question confronting natural law theories is therefore 
where these goods and principles come from. It often appears, on a 
casual reading of both classical and contemporary natural law theorists, 
as if they come out of nowhere. Natural law is presented as if it were 
(in the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes) a ‘brooding omnipresence in 
the sky’ 2 —a set of timeless, unchanging principles received fully-
formed from above.  
The work of Grisez and Finnis does little to dispel this perception. 
Finnis’s account of natural law, in particular, is based on a set of basic 
goods—such as life, knowledge, friendship, play and religion—that he 
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1  See, for example, Germain Grisez, The Way of the Lord Jesus: Christian Moral Principles 
(Franciscan Press, 1983) 121-2; John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford 
University Press, 2nd ed, 2011) ch 5. 
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characterises as self-evident, indemonstrable and underived, 3  along 
with a collection of principles of practical reasonableness that are 
analogous to mathematical principles and therefore, as he puts it, ‘have 
no history’.4 Finnis draws a distinction between theories of natural law, 
which form part of the history of ideas, and natural law itself, which he 
contends is ahistorical. Why, then, does Finnis talk about natural law in 
this way? Where, in particular, does he think its content comes from? 
The answer seems to be that he thinks natural law comes directly from 
God: it ‘express[es] aspects, intelligible to us, of [God’s] creative 
intention’.5 This might seem, at first, to explain why he regards it as 
timeless. 
Further reflection, though, reveals this explanation as inadequate. If 
Finnis’s ahistorical view of natural law is attributable to his belief that 
natural law comes from God, this must be because he thinks God works 
in the world in a particular way. Specifically, this approach suggests 
what I will call a synchronic view of God’s agency. The precepts of 
natural law, on this view, are timeless because they exist in the mind of 
God, but they are also accessible to human reason. It follows that they 
are fully embodied in the natural world when the faculty of reason 
comes into being—when the first humans are created or, perhaps, when 
they obtain knowledge of good and evil.6 This, however, is not the only 
possible way of thinking about God’s way of creating natural law; 
indeed, I want to suggest it is not even a very biblical way of doing so.  
I begin by outlining an alternative account of natural law that depicts 
it as taking shape progressively throughout human history. Natural law, 
on this view, reflects ongoing human efforts to work out how best to 
cooperate and flourish in our changing natural and social environments. 
Next, I draw support for this perspective from the writings of Thomas 
Aquinas, who is widely regarded as the paradigmatic natural law 
theorist.7 Aquinas expressly affirms that natural law can change; this 
reflects his distinction between eternal law, which reflects God’s 
unchanging design, and natural law, which is accessible by human 
reason. Finally, I argue there is biblical support for an evolutionary 
conception of natural law. The biblical narrative is consistent with a 
diachronic view of God’s agency, where God’s plan reveals itself 
gradually over time. 
 
3  Finnis (n 1) 33-4, 64-9. 
4  Ibid 24. 
5  Ibid 389-90. 
6  Genesis 3:5-6. 
7  See, for example, Mark C Murphy, Natural Law in Jurisprudence and Politics (Cambridge 
University Press, 2006) 1. 
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I Natural Law in Human History 
What more can we say, then, about where natural law comes from? 
Must we regard it as arising fully formed at the start of human history? 
My recent book, Natural Law and the Nature of Law, 8  offers an 
alternative to Finnis’s view on this issue. This alternative rejects the 
idea that natural law is outside history. Rather, I argue that natural law 
is objective and normative, but nonetheless socially embodied, 
historically extended and dependent on contingent facts about human 
nature.9 Principles of natural law reflect the ongoing human quest to 
work out how best to live flourishing, fulfilling lives given the nature 
we have and the social worlds we inhabit.   
First, natural law is socially embodied. This is true in both 
epistemological and ontological senses. The way we discover the nature 
of the basic goods and principles of practical reasonableness that 
comprise natural law is by interpreting social practices. We will 
generally start by looking at practices in our own community, asking 
what goals we value for their own sake and what constraints we place 
on practical reasoning. We will then compare these ideas to our 
intuitions about specific cases and perhaps also the practices of other 
communities that we know about. 
It is by looking beyond our own community and considering human 
societies in general that we can potentially identify goods and principles 
that are common to humans as a whole. This kind of inference works 
two ways. First, it is by observing different communities that we form 
knowledge about what values and principles are universal and not 
merely relative to one’s own society. Second, it is the fact that natural 
law provides normative guidance for humans in a range of diverse 
settings that makes it natural law in the first place. Our investigation 
into social practices therefore potentially bolsters our confidence in the 
objectivity of value.  
Second, natural law is historically extended. Human history is, at 
least in part, the story of the human quest to work out how best to live 
flourishing and fulfilling lives in a range of different—and more or less 
challenging—natural, social and economic environments. This is not 
knowledge that can be gained or processed all at once. Rather, it is 
something that human communities have struggled to work out over 
time. The precepts of natural law, in this sense, are the product of a 
process of social evolution and human discovery stretching over 
multiple generations. We learn what works and what doesn’t work 
through a social and historical process of trial and error.  
 
8  Jonathan Crowe, Natural Law and the Nature of Law (Cambridge University Press, 2019). 
9  Ibid 5-8. 
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Our grasp of natural law, in this sense, changes and grows with our 
self-understanding. More fundamentally, however, natural law itself 
changes as it adapts itself to our changing environments. The best way 
of living a fulfilling and harmonious life in centuries past may not be 
the best way of doing so today. A helpful distinction can be drawn here 
between the fundamental precepts of natural law, which change 
relatively little, and their applications to specific existential and social 
questions, which may change significantly depending on the 
circumstances and context. However, to maintain that the precepts 
themselves are entirely unchanging is, I think, to overlook the massive 
shifts that have occurred in the course of human history.  
The good of friendship gives a striking example.10 Finnis uses this 
idea very broadly to cover everything from intimate relationships to 
social bonds within a community.11 It can hardly be denied, however, 
that the human concept of community has changed very fundamentally 
over time. Human societies were once structured around families and 
tribes, whereas now we organise ourselves by nations (and even supra-
national communities like the European Union). This massive shift in 
the nature of communities has also radically changed how we live 
together within them. This seems to be a change in the central facets of 
natural law, not merely its details. 
A deeper question is whether we can reliably know the fundamentals 
of natural law except by way of its detailed applications. Natural law, 
unlike the revealed law of scripture, is known to us through reason. Our 
capacity for reason, in turn, is exercised through engagement with our 
social environment. We come to know the natural law only by working 
through practical dilemmas and thereby gaining knowledge of the most 
reliable ways to advance human flourishing. This socially embodied 
and historically extended process of reasoning reveals to us unchanging 
components of natural law, such as the prohibition on murder. However, 
even with respect to these fundamental precepts, it is misleading to say 
that they ‘have no history’.  
Third, natural law (as the name suggests) depends on facts about 
human nature. Our nature as humans is partly a product of our biology. 
However, it is also a product of our social environment. Natural law 
instructs us in the best way to live flourishing lives given the nature we 
have and the environment we inhabit. It follows from this that if human 
nature was significantly different, then natural law would also be 
different. Human nature, however, is at least partly contingent, in the 
sense that it logically could have been otherwise. Indeed, if we accept 
that human nature changes with shifts in our social environment, it 
follows that our nature has changed throughout our history. 
 
10  Ibid 27-30. 
11  Finnis (n 1) ch 6. 
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All these factors indicate that natural law cannot be adequately 
understood in an ahistorical way. A potential worry about this 
conception of natural law is that by emphasising its responsiveness to 
social and historical conditions, we thereby undermine its objective and 
normative character. However, I think this worry is misplaced. I 
suggested previously that by observing the practices of different human 
communities we can more accurately identify those fundamental values 
and normative principles that humans have in common. All human 
communities, we can observe, place value on life, health, friendship, 
play, meaning and reasonableness, although the exact form this takes 
differs from context to context. These universal values, then, have a 
plausible claim to be regarded as objective components of human 
flourishing.12  
It might be objected that this methodology violates the separation 
between fact and value famously pointed out by David Hume. 13 
However, the suggestion is not that the values and principles common 
to human communities are normatively binding because they are found 
in different social settings. Rather, the fact they are found in different 
societies provides plausible evidence that they are conducive to human 
flourishing.14 It would be surprising if human social evolution, over a 
long period and across a variety of diverse natural and social 
environments, did not select for precepts that are at least presumptively 
valuable as guides to human behaviour.  
II Natural Law in Aquinas 
The picture of natural law I have outlined has some important 
advantages over Finnis’s theory. The most important of these, to my 
mind, is that it enables us to engage constructively with the question of 
where the content of natural law comes from. The idea that natural law 
comes into being fully formed independent of history makes it difficult 
to engage in reasoned disputes about its content, particularly if people 
also have different intuitions about specific issues or cases. The account 
I develop in my book, by contrast, enables us to place natural law within 
a broader discussion about the evolution of social practices and how 
they promote the goal of human flourishing.  
Further support for this account of natural law, I suggest, can be 
drawn from Aquinas. Grisez and Finnis depict their views as an 
interpretation of Aquinas; 15  for this reason, Finnis prefers the label 
 
12  For a detailed account of the basic forms of human flourishing, see Crowe (n 8) ch 2. 
13  David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Clarendon, 1978) 469-70 (bk III, pt I, § I). 
14  Compare Finnis (n 1) 33-4. 
15  Grisez (n 1) xxviii; Finnis (n 1) vi. 
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‘new classical natural law theory’.16 However, unlike those authors, 
Aquinas explicitly embraces the idea that natural law can change over 
time. Question 94, Article 5 in the First Part of the Second Part of the 
Summa is entitled ‘Whether the natural law can be changed?’ Aquinas’s 
response is a clear ‘yes’: 
A change in the natural law may be understood in two ways. First, by way 
of addition. In this sense, nothing hinders the natural law from being 
changed: since many things for the benefit of human life have been added 
over and above the natural law, both by the Divine law and by human laws. 
Secondly, a change in the natural law may be understood by way of 
subtraction. … In this sense, the natural law is altogether unchangeable in 
its first principles: but in its secondary principles … it may be changed in 
some particular cases of rare occurrence, through some special causes 
hindering the observance of such precepts.17 
Aquinas, then, holds that the fundamentals of natural law do not change. 
However, its details can and do change. This may be because God 
grants us additional revelation on how best to lead flourishing lives, as 
occurs regularly throughout the Bible. It may also be because human 
laws and social conventions give different shape to natural law at 
different points in history. Aquinas makes it clear that these changes in 
the social environment can change the natural law itself, by dictating 
the contours of social life. They specify details of human flourishing 
that would otherwise be indeterminate.  
Aquinas therefore affirms that the natural law may change by way 
of addition. He generally denies that it can change through subtraction: 
that is, the primary precepts of natural law admit of no exceptions and 
the secondary precepts derived from them rarely do so. However, he 
nonetheless recognises that exceptional circumstances may arise where 
what appears to be a well worked out consequence of the first principles 
of natural law does not apply. Our understanding of natural law may 
evolve over time in response to particular cases, even to the extent of 
creating exceptions to what were previously understood as general 
requirements. This point, too, recognises the relevance of human 
circumstances in defining the content of natural law.  
Aquinas, as many readers will recall, identifies four main types of 
law in the Summa: eternal law, natural law, human law and divine law.18 
Eternal law, as the name indicates, does not change, since it is a supreme 
 
16  John Finnis, ‘Reflections and Responses’ in John Keown and Robert P George (eds), Reason, 
Morality and Law: The Philosophy of John Finnis (Oxford University Press, 2013) 459, 468-
69 n 31. 
17  Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (Dominican Fathers trans, Ave Maria, 1948) I-II, q 94, 
art 5. For helpful commentary, see J Budziszewski, Commentary on Thomas Aquinas’s 
Treatise on Law (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 282-3.  
18  Aquinas (n 17) I-II, q 91. 
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idea [Ratio] existing in the mind of God.19 Natural law, however, is that 
part of the eternal law governing human conduct accessible through 
human reason, 20  while divine law is that part of the eternal law 
governing human conduct revealed to us through scripture.21 Aquinas 
denies that humans can possess direct or complete knowledge of the 
eternal law: ‘no one can know the eternal law, as it is in itself, except 
the blessed [in Heaven] who see God in His essence. But every rational 
creature knows it in its reflection, greater or less’.22 The basic precepts 
of natural law, by contrast, are accessible and ‘equally known by all’.23 
Aquinas’s distinction between knowledge of eternal law and 
knowledge of natural law can be understood as manifesting what my 
collaborator, Constance Youngwon Lee, aptly terms ‘a dialectic of dual 
perspectives’.24 The whole of eternal law exists perfectly in the mind of 
God. Human knowledge, by contrast, is drastically limited by our fallen 
nature. Nonetheless, for Aquinas, we still have sufficient reasoning 
abilities to access the fundamental precepts of natural law. Natural law, 
then, is a concept defined by reference to the limitations of human 
reason; it exists precisely so that humans, despite our inherent fallibility 
and depravity, can nonetheless access truths about human flourishing 
and be held accountable before God for our actions.  
Aquinas’s presentation of these issues makes central use of the 
distinction between the fundamental precepts of natural law and its 
detailed applications. I suggested earlier that even the basic precepts of 
natural law may sometimes change with radical shifts in human social 
organisation. Furthermore, our knowledge of these precepts, like that of 
secondary applications, occurs through a historical process of 
accumulated human wisdom. Natural law as a whole is therefore best 
understood as a product of human social evolution, even though some 
of its principles may prove to be unchanging. The same mode of 
discovery applies to both its primary and secondary dimensions. 
III Natural Law in the Biblical Narrative 
I suggested previously that one possible explanation of why Finnis sees 
natural law as timeless is that he thinks it comes directly from God. We 
can now see why this explanation is inadequate; indeed, the divine 
origins of natural law support the opposite conclusion. Finnis’s 
conception of natural law, as I said before, seems to imply a synchronic 
 
19  Ibid I-II, q 93, art 1. 
20  Ibid I-II, q 94, art 4. 
21  Ibid I-II, q 91, art 4. 
22  Ibid I-II, q 93, art 2. 
23  Ibid I-II, q 94, art 4. 
24  Constance Youngwon Lee, ‘The Spark that Still Shines: John Calvin on Conscience and 
Natural Law’ (2019) 8(3) Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 615, 615. 
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view of God’s agency, where the precepts of natural law are embodied 
in human reason at a certain point and remain unchanged thereafter. 
This is, however, far from the only possible way of thinking about how 
God acts in the world. God, after all, is responsible for creating 
everything in the universe, including human institutions and history. It 
therefore seems at least possible that God intends natural law to be 
progressively shaped and discovered by humans through these social 
and historical processes. 
God, on this view, does not create or reveal natural law 
independently of human actions. Rather, God’s plan for human 
flourishing unfolds itself over time. This view of God’s agency is not 
without biblical foundations. Natural law in the Old Testament takes 
one form for Adam and Eve,25 another for Noah and his descendants,26 
another for Abraham27 and yet another for Moses and Aaron.28 The 
biblical people of Israel are chosen by God, but natural law is not 
revealed to them all at once. Even the Ten Commandments do not give 
a complete blueprint for society. 29  Rather, they experiment with 
different laws and forms of governance, adapting them to the needs of 
the time, and often making serious mistakes for which God must bring 
them to account. 
Codes of law are promulgated and associated with detailed rituals 
for purification and atonement.30 Some laws seek to preserve physical 
health and social harmony to enable social co-existence and ensure the 
survival of the group. 31  Other laws create internal standards of 
excellence to facilitate social virtue and belonging.32 The apparatus of 
law, however, leads to its own challenges. Power accrues in members 
of the community who are blamed when things go badly.33 Different 
forms of legal authority and governance are tried in response to 
different historical conditions.34 The most successful rulers are wise 
and humble and unified the people. However, all are fallible.35 
The biblical passages cited above all concern positive or specially 
revealed law, rather than natural law as such. However, all these biblical 
examples of positive law, insofar as they reflect God’s plan for Israel, 
 
25  Genesis 2:16-17; 3:1-5. 
26  Genesis 6:13-22; 7:1-5; 9:1-17. 
27  Genesis 15; 17:1-14. 
28  Exodus 12:1-23, 43-9; 20-3. 
29  Exodus 20:1-17. 
30  Exodus 20-3; Leviticus 1-27.  
31  See, for example, Leviticus 11-15; 17:10-16; 18.  
32  See, for example, Exodus 25-30.  
33  Numbers 11:1-15; 12; 14:1-12.  
34  See, for example, Exodus 18:13-26; Numbers 11:16-30; Judges 2:16-23; 1 Samuel 8:1-22.  
35  See, for example, Exodus 4:10; Numbers 11:14; 2 Samuel 24:10. 
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must at least be consistent with natural law. Aquinas seems to view 
them as continuous with natural law; both positive and revealed law, for 
him, can bring about changes in natural law by specifying its details. If 
natural law is discovered, as I suggested above, through its socially 
embodied manifestations, then the diverse forms that positive and 
revealed law take throughout the biblical narrative provide evidence for 
natural law’s historically embedded character. 
The biblical story then culminates in the person of Jesus, who offers 
a new understanding of the law. However, he does not come to sweep 
away the old law, but rather to fulfil it.36 The fulfilment of the law is 
thus enacted through an embodied human being with a life and a history 
of his own, as well as a unique place in the history of humanity as a 
whole. It is through this socially embodied and historically extended 
process of becoming more fully human that we fulfil the natural law or 
enter the Kingdom of God. The Kingdom of God, Jesus says, is not over 
here or over there, but among us. 37 It is ‘like a grain of mustard seed 
that a man took and sowed in his garden, and it grew and became a tree, 
and the birds of the air made nests in its branches’.38 Its fulfilment is 
not to be found at some past point in history, but rather in the promise 
of a future to come.  
The biblical narrative, then, seems consistent with a diachronic 
(rather than synchronic) view of God’s agency, where God’s plan 
unfolds progressively over time. It is, of course, true that from God’s 
perspective natural law is still timeless and unchanging, because God is 
omniscient and exists outside of time. However, emphasising this 
perspective, as Finnis seems to do,39 neglects the distinction between 
eternal law and natural law developed by Aquinas. Natural law theory 
is best understood as an account of what is good and reasonable for 
humans. 40  It serves as a guide for human action in our social and 
historical predicament. It makes most sense, then, to consider the 
content of natural law from a human point of view. Humans, unlike God, 
have limited knowledge and exist within time. Natural law, for us, takes 
shape in a diachronic way.  
A belief in God as the ultimate source of natural law therefore does 
not, by itself, support the conclusion that natural law is timeless and 
unchanging (at least when considered from a human perspective). God, 
of course, exists outside of time; from God’s perspective, then, natural 
law (like all of creation) is timeless. However, God has created natural 
law specifically for the direction of humans. It differs in this respect, as 
 
36  Matthew 5:17. 
37  Luke 17:21. 
38  Luke 13:19 (ESV). 
39  See, for example, Finnis (n 1) 390. 
40  Crowe (n 8) 33-4. 
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Aquinas recognised, from the scientific laws that God has ordained for 
the broader physical workings of the universe. From God’s perspective, 
there is (in a sense) no natural law; there is only eternal law. Everything 
is known. From our human perspective, however, many things are not 
known and cannot be known. Insofar as they are known, it is only by 
the grace of God. And it may be that God reveals them to us only one 
piece at a time—or reveals them differently at different times and in 
different places.  
 
